by Hazel Lang & Marc Purcell
The end of 1993 saw Burmese opposition groups experiencing a renewed period of pressure from a variety of sources. The arrest of the 13 Burmese students at a human rights seminar in Bangkok by Immigration and Special Branch police on Dec 3 and the accompanying stern warning concerning the conduct of anti-Rangoon political activities on Thai soil marks a change in Thai practice towards the students. Previous arrests were focused on students who undertook public protests outside the Burmese embassy and the like. These arrests and other detentions, along with new building infrastructure we saw at Maneeloy Holding Centre in Ratchaburi province ('safe camp'), indicate a concerted effort to remove these troublesome dissidents from the Thai political landscape.
The clampdown has been extended to making life difficult for the Burmese opposition leaders. DAB Chairman and KNU leader Gen Bo Mya was reportedly refused a re-entry visa to Thailand from his November trip to the UK. Dr Sein Win, prime minister-in-exile of NCGUB, and other opposition leaders, also experienced Thai re-entry visa refusals following their November lobbying trip to the UN General Assembly. National Security Council (NSC) Sec. Gen. Charan Kulawanijaya was quoted saying that Bangkok denied the visas as part of its commitment to stop Burmese opposition figures from using Thai territory as a base: 'Thailand is supporting the Burmese government plan for national reconciliation. To issue visas to those people means to encourage them to continue fighting'.
Other more ambiguous events included news reports of an NSC announcement for an end of December review proposing the closure of the Thai-Burmese border and a self-proposed NSC assumption of control over the border. PM Chuan Leekpai responded immediately denying any reports that the NSC will ask the government to review Thailand's constructive engagement policy with Burma and to close the border. In rejecting suggestions to close the border, he also stated that any such closure order came under the mandate of the local provincial governor in the event of fighting in Burma escalating and spilling into Thai villages. Foreign Minister Prasong Soonsiri also rejected the reports and when asked about the NSC's planned review of foreign policy, commented the NSC was merely an 'advisory agency'.
In terms of the ethnic nationalities, the Mon have been experiencing substantial direct pressure. In October the Thai military ordered the 8,000 inhabitants of Loh Loe refugee camp to relocate to a new site at Halockhani on the border, a controversial site due to its proximity a few kilometres from the Burmese army (and where at present there are already 500 internally displaced people). Because of this vulnerable position, NGOs working with the refugees feel that while some will go to Halockhani, most would rather go to existing camps in Thailand as a safer option. Further, the forced relocation violates an agreement reached in February by the NSC, Thai army, district officials and the Mon National Relief Committee (MNRC) operating the Loh Loe and other Mon camps which clearly stated that Mon refugees could shelter on Thai soil until they could return home after a change in the political situation..
However, for the moment, relocation is on hold until the end of the dry season while political manoeuvering between the Mon resistance and Slorc concerning a ceasefire is undertaken. The immediate aim of the Thais is to pressure the Mon to enter a ceasefire negotiation with the Slorc. Both the Thai government and Slorc require a stable environment for the construction of the lucrative gas pipeline from the Martaban gas fields. According to the Manerplaw-based environmental NGO, Green November 32, the pipeline, already under construction on the Burmese side, will pass through the narrowest section of the Burmese Tenasserim division (45km to the border). Green November calculate that the most likely route will be through Nat Ei Taung (50km south of Three Pagodas Pass) on the Thai side. GN32 also have reports of highway construction up to Nat Ei Taung and it is also in the vicinity of Loh Loe and other settlements.
Slorc leader Khin Nyunt in November made a call for ceasefire negotiations during his visit to Ye in Mon State; (he also visited Pa-an in Karen state and Loikaw in Karenni state making such statements). The Slorc have targetted the Mon because of their weak strategic position; the territory they hold is marginal and they have Thai cooperation due to the gas pipeline. Publicly, the Mon have responded with the concerted voice of the DAB. Indeed these ceasefire overtures and the concomitant intentions of the Slorc has been a foremost topic in many discussions in Manerplaw and the numerous opposition groups.
The DAB met in Manerplaw between December 7th and 10th and after long debates and discussions agreed to offer a 5-member advance delegation to prepare for any official ceasefire talks (Major Gen Maung Maung of KNU, Khai Soe Naing of the Arakan Liberation Party, Nai Pe Thein Zar of New Mon State Party, Dr Naing Aung of the All Burma Students' Democratic Party and U Mya Soe of the Democratic Party for the New Society). New Mon State Party representative Nai Pe Thein Zar told us at this time that the DAB's previous conditions for talks were not stated in the offer at this point. These conditions were that peace negotiations be held in a third country with the presence of international mediators and that Aung San Suu Kyi and all political prisoners be released. He said that anticipated conditions for negotiations would only be disclosed at preliminary talks. The silence of the DAB on its earlier conditions can be perceived as part of the tactical manoeuvering towards the negotiations, or it can be seen as a substantial concession in departing from a previous strongly-held series of demands. The semantic softening process is occurring on the Slorc's part too; Khin Nyunt's speeches deliberately omitted references to the ethnic opposition as 'terrorists' and 'insurgents' instead using the term 'armed groups'.
By December 16 the Slorc officially rejected the offer to talk with a united ethnic and opposition movement under the DAB. A Burmese Armed Forces Attache to Thailand at this time responded:
'As we have stated before, we will not be able to accept...the DAB. We will deal with respective [ethnic] groups...We still prefer to talk with individual groups because each group has its own priorities and interests...We will not even be able to do that with NDF...'.
Also, groups such as DPNS and ABSDF represent political/military groups that are not part of the ethnic national armies that the Slorc wishes to negotiate with. Slorc wants instead to strike ceasefire deals on a unilateral basis with the ethnic nationality armies. They do not want to include Burman dominated pro-democracy groups that sprang from the events of 1988. Indeed they wish to isolate from the negotiation process these groups who rely on ethnic nationality army support to operate in their areas. Such a fate has befallen ABSDF in Kachin areas when their arms supplies were curtailed by the KIO when it entered into negotiations with Slorc. There is an almost universal cynicism expressed towards such a divide-and-rule strategy.
In mid December the KIO - with their DAB membership temporarily suspended - moved out of their Manerplaw office. They have re-established themselves in Wa territory. The KIO are at pains to express they have signed only a ceasefire and not a durable political settlement. Terms of the ceasefire include maintaining current territory held, exchange of prisoners and the prospect of future development projects. Probably to the Slorc's chargrin the KIO have chosen not to attend the National Convention when it resumes in January. They have close relations with the Wa who are participating and will closely monitor through them the Convention's progress.
The Karen are now the largest remaining ethnic army and while there has been no dry season offensive to date, consolidation of strategic positions on both sides is occurring. There is an unconfirmed report that the Slorc has taken over 1,000 porters from the Pa-an district in Karen state. Helicopter surveillance flights by the tatmadaw in early December were also made over ABSDF headquarters in Dag Win. Preparations are being made by ABSDF medics to evacuate patients in anticipation of a late dry season offensive. In strategic terms, it is felt Manerplaw is well defended against direct attack from the Slorc-held Sleeping Dog Mountain. However, it is vunerable to becoming cut-off from its hinterland if the Slorc were to take the area at the confluence of the Salween and Moei rivers and at another point downstream from Manerplaw. ABSDF camps are also exposed in their positions. Certainly, then, there is a military imperative for negotiations, alone or with the DAB. The Thais would like to see development projects such as the Salween dams go ahead and are keen to remove refugee camps back across the border if ceasefires take place.
Padoh Yo Shu of the KNU in Manerplaw, who among other responsibilities is the chairman of the 'internally displaced relief committtee', stressed the scale and severity of the problem for people displaced within the Karen area. While 150,000 people are listed as internally displaced, he estimates the uncounted figure to be around 300,000 in Karen territory alone. Food shortages are critical because it is difficult to grow food when harvests cannot be reaped due to constant forced relocation which has been stepped up in the past 2 years.
Further muddying the waters on the political landscape is Khun Sa's mid-December proclamation of independence from Burma and his election as President of the Shan State Restoration Council. This coincided with Shan New Year and an influx of foreign and Thai journalists. Contiguous with this 10,000 tatmadaw troops were mustered on the periphery of Khun Sa territory from which an attack was launched. While the Slorc proclaimed the capture of 2 heroin refineries, USDEA officials were meeting in Rangoon with the Slorc. Opposition groups are skeptical about the determination of Slorc, viewing the attack as cosmetic and a propaganda exercise; indeed the Slorc's absence from the November anti-drug meeting in Chiang Mai lends credence to this view.
Overall, everyone we spoke to stressed that because of these pressures, a critical phase had been entered into and that the next few months of the dry season will be crucial for the Burmese opposition groups. In light of the proposed ceasefire talks, the Thai clampdown on opposition groups on its territory, the Thai and ASEAN desire to incorporate Burma into the regional economic framework, the General Assembly's most condemning resolution of the Burmese regime's human rights violations (and the U.S.'s stronger dissenting statement denouncing the National Convention as a fraud) and the approaching 5th anniversary of Aung San Suu Kyi's house arrest to identify some concerns. For these reasons opposition members we spoke to all believed that 1994 will be the most important year since the events of 1988.
[E-Mail Received 6 January 1994. Ed.]